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FOREWORD

The Army operates within a global strategic
environment. During the Cold War, the forward deployed
Army was focused on countering Soviet and Warsaw Pact
aggression. Had the Communist forces attacked, NATO
forces would have used air and land power to halt the
advancing enemy troops and, then, under the aegis of
Airland Battle, gone over to a counteroffensive to roll them
back. For all that, this war that never happened would have
been bloody and horrible, but it was also clearly defined.
The parameters of warfare now and into the 21st century
are much more complex. In the following monograph,
Lieutenant General Claudia Kennedy, the Army Deputy
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, postulates a future world
where challenges to the national security and national
interests of the United States will come from many sources.
Not only will the armed forces of the United States have to
be prepared to counter attacks by nation-states with armed
forces equipped with modern weapons, they must also be
ready to address challenges across a wide spectrum from
urban warlords to narco-terrorists.
Today there is a great deal of talk about focusing on high
end threats and relying on one dimension of military power,
air power, to halt set-piece attacks by any would-be
aggressor. As General Kennedy’s monograph indicates, that
narrow focus addresses only a small and distinct portion of
the possible challenges we will face in the 21st century.
Because the evolving operational debates have to be
considered within the probable future strategic context, I
commend to you The Age of Revolutions.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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THE AGE OF REVOLUTIONS

A Look Back from the Future.
Historians may well dub the decades surrounding the
change from the second millennium to the third millennium
as an age of multiple and simultaneous revolutions.
Certainly history will record that this was a very unstable
period, driven by an accelerating change of pace that many
of the time found to be both alarming and exhausting. A
survey of the writings of futurists like John L. Petersen,
Jeffrey Barnett, Ralph Peters, and Alvin and Heidi Toffler
will indicate that those who thought and wrote about the
future in the late 1990s were both hopeful and sobered by
the range of possible futures.
From the perspective of 2050, students of history will
note that some futurists of the late 20th century postulated
a world of 2025 divided into three distinct populations. The
first of these groups, they thought, the advanced nations,
might comprise less than one and a half billion people. The
next and largest group, a middle group of nations made up of
those where the greatest growth was projected, would have
a population of five billion people. The third group,
comprised of nations struggling on the brink of disaster,
would number about two billion people. These demographic
estimates were, even in the ebullient and exciting world of
the futurists of the 1990s, notoriously suspect, but they
provided a contextual frame of reference for thinking about
the human dimensions of what might lay ahead.
It was change that affected each of these groups in
profoundly different ways, especially the affluent nations
which, in 2025, still includes the United States. While
change brought enormous rewards for some, for others it
fostered an unbroken string of unmitigated struggles laced
with failure and violence. While the drawdowns that
followed the Persian Gulf War of 1991 had stabilized by the
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turn of the century, and modernization efforts like Army
XXI and the Army After Next proceeded apace, the military
forces of the United States operated at an exhausting pace
through a series of peace enforcement and peace-keeping
operations as well as responding to various crises presented
by the usual suspects in Southwest Asia and on the Korean
Peninsula. One thing became obvious rather early on: the
military was going to have to operate at those points where
success and failure collided; where the advancing future
confronted a longing for the past and where technologies
ignited and then fed the most primitive of human emotions.
Back from the Future for a Look Ahead.
With this brief bit of hindsight from what the historian of
2050 might write about the first three decades of the first
century of the third millennium, let me posit just four of
several possible revolutions from today's perspective, their
effects, and where the military of the United States may or
may not fit in.
The Information Revolution. Historians will tell you
that the harnessing of electricity had profound social,
economic, and even political impact on humanity. Some
futurists believe that the information revolution will have
far greater social, economic, and political impact. Today, for
instance, there are 200 million computers. In less than 5
years, by the time the high school graduating class of 1998
departs college, the number of computers in the world may
exceed 500 million. Furthermore, computers will be 5,00010,000 times faster by the year 2025 than they are today.
This means the world is going to become increasingly
networked with stationary and non-stationary objects
netted together in a vast and continuously active net.
Not everyone believes the information systems explosion
manifesting itself in inexpensive and universal interconnectivity will be entirely positive. While technology
empowers, it can also destabilize. Information is the most
destabilizing factor in the world today. We live in a world
2

glutted with information, but with a deficit of understanding.
A new socio-political and economic trinity for the 21st
century is emerging, consisting of the government, the
citizen, and information. Many Americans are already
comfortable with this trinity and now are routinely using
information to create abundance—if not wealth—while
maintaining a remarkable level of social stability.
Nevertheless, even in America some citizens feel misplaced.
For many of them, traditionally-held beliefs and values
have been threatened. Reluctant to “get outside their
comfort zones” by adopting new ways of thinking and
working, they are being left behind by the network economy.
They will inevitably form an economically disadvantaged
underclass.
Meanwhile, throughout the world, systems of social
organizations are seeking a new equilibrium. While this is
an exciting process, it is also one that can be quite chaotic
and, occasionally, violent. Uncertainty seems to be a
constant in this quest for a new equilibrium.
In the less-competitive, more volatile regions of the
world, the negative side of the information revolution is
multiplied. In those areas, its positive effects are limited to
the elite, while the negative effects proliferate among the
majority. Western culture, particularly American culture,
born on the wings of television to people in cities and the
countryside alike, sometimes provides dazzling glimpses of
lifestyles that will prove largely chimerical.
While many complain about the junk information that
bombards us, there is an inescapable paradox in the
information revolution: it takes information to handle
information. Furthermore, the user has to be comfortable
with the information. Many nations and cultures will not be
able to handle information as easily, freely, and comfortably
as we can; and this will not only make them less
competitive, it may also incite envy, possibly even hatred,
for our abilities and successes.
3

The Socio-Biological Revolution. The sociobiological revolution we now experience, and which will
extend well into the next two decades, involves the societal
role of women and the evolution of work.
Since the 1960s, women have made tremendous
progress in our society. This is sometimes difficult to
remember when the immediate focus is on the latest sexual
harassment case or about families under stress. Women
have, in fact, been introduced into every aspect of the
education system and into a large part of the work force.
And while gender equity problems linger, on balance the
inclusion of women into the wider aspects of the socioeconomic and political arenas has contributed to our
national dynamism. Those nations with cultures unable to
accommodate the role of women are not likely to benefit
fully from the information revolution and are unlikely to
reap the rewards of global competition.
The second part of the socio-biological revolution is the
evolution of the nature of work. As the trend toward the
displacement of manufacturing workers continues, the
problems that accompany this transition from the
industrial age to the information age will persist. According
to some estimates, by 2025 over 95 percent of work in
advanced nations will involve some use of information
technology in direct or embedded forms. Workers in the 21st
century workplace, like the soldiers of the Army After Next,
will be dynamically involved with information as they
synthesize existing knowledge into new and innovative
solutions.
While many of the promises of the value-added
efficiencies of information technology have yet to be fully
realized, we are being compelled to work in smarter ways.
These changing patterns, which tend to favor advanced
nations, will start to tear down the structural barriers that
have blocked the employment of groups like senior workers
and single women with children. This transformation will
prove dispiriting to those nations and peoples who rely on
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muscle-power and who fail to educate themselves for this
new age.
The Efficiency Revolution. The third revolution is the
efficiency revolution which is often underestimated and
overshadowed by the information revolution. American
culture is particularly and peculiarly geared to efficiency.
While there are psychological and cultural costs, in general
our focus on efficiency has enabled us to generate more
wealth for more people in less time than ever before. It is a
revolution of small details with huge impacts.
Productivity is the most important factor resulting from
efficiency. Over the past half century, our society enabled
higher levels of productivity through fuller participation in
education and throughout virtually every sector of the work
force. As the years passed, the benefits accrued to more and
more of our citizens. Through the enablers of technoefficiency, as the Information Age progresses, the efficiency
revolution will widen as more computer chips are embedded
in objects. The next stage in the efficiency revolution, as
genetics research begins to deliver practical results, will be
the bio-effiiency revolution.
The Revolution in Military Affairs. Many experts
across a wide range of disciplines have differing points of
view concerning the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).
While they may argue about its technologies, its form and
substance, and all the implications thereof, most agree that
there have been profound changes not only in the
technological realm but also in the area of human behavior.
I firmly believe that we must exploit the positive effects of
the RMA, but I am also concerned that this RMA could prove
to be largely irrelevant.
Today, the United States is the world's preeminent
military power. Most analysts predict that no “peer”
competitors will arise to challenge us for the next 15-25
years, if then. Russia and China are the only nations that, as
of this time, seem potentially able to attain anything like
“peer” competitor status by 2020. The reality is that the
5

United States is likely to remain the world's superpower
with all the challenges and responsibilities that entails.
While Russia has a troubling nuclear arsenal, its conventional forces have limited capabilities. China will
continue to improve its military capabilities through
selective modernization and the exploitation of asymmetrical strategies and may seek to become a regional
hegemon in the Western Pacific. For the foreseeable future,
the United States will continue to face a very real threat on
the Korean Peninsula and continuing crises in Southwest
Asia.
While there are a number of threats to U.S. interests and
to those of our friends and allies, the armed forces we are
building, and the forces we will deploy in the future, will be
so powerful that it is highly unlikely that any other power
will try to compete with our armed forces on our terms.
Additionally, we are not likely to see large-scale aerial
contests like the Battle of Britain, nor will there be fleet-onfleet battles reminiscent of Midway in the near future.
Given the kinds of threats and challenges we can forecast,
this will be the age of the soldier. But even ground combat is
likely to become more an issue of logistics and countering
the threat of weapons of mass destruction than of
competitive technologies. The edge the United States
possesses in traditional forms of warfare is significant, and
it will remain so for at least a generation even if we add
nothing new to the existing arsenal. The problems that will
trouble us—and cost the lives of Americans in uniform—lie
elsewhere.
Future Enemies.
No potential enemy is attempting to build an RMA force.
Some nations will leverage technology to modernize
selectively, but they will do so to enable them to act
asymmetrically. The four revolutions I have described,
which are inspired and led by the United States, have
changed the rules so profoundly that they may backfire on
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us. In short, because we have focused on building U.S.
Armed Forces to be preeminent in force-on-force combat, we
may be surprised by the enemies of the future. These will
include warlords, tribal chiefs, drug traffickers, international criminal cartels, terrorists, and cyber-bandits.
Additionally, the United States, as the world's leading
power, will continue to play a major role in addressing
humanitarian emergencies and the very uncivil actors of
the world's many civil wars.
While conventional warfare will remain a possibility,
especially in Korea and the Persian Gulf, and regional
conflicts could be ignited by any number of circumstances,
as contemporary revolutions break down traditional
structures, and as the effects are exacerbated by growing
populations, global urbanization, unprecedented diasporas,
cheap transportation, and mass communications, those
actors prone to violence will find plenty of opportunities.
The violent actors are less likely to be established state
authorities initiating sanctioned conflict. Rather they are
more likely to be fringe actors like nationalists bent on
genocide and fanatics fueled by convictions that do not
respond to negotiations. These kinds of actors are
consummate opportunists who revel in the possibilities that
accompany social, economic, and political disorder. When
the end of the Cold War unleashed this era of global
destablization, it unmasked hidden hatreds and discontents that, in places like the former Yugoslavia and the
southern Caucasus, had been suppressed for nearly half a
century.
In this age of inspired revolutions, the United States will
continue to confront very basic human problems. While
American forces are structured and equipped so that no
conventional military force on earth can hope to fight us and
win, the primary challenges may come from encounters
with those who are ruthless in the asymmetric uses of
violence and force.
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There is an enduring American predilection toward the
use of technology which has served us well in most of our
conflicts in this century. But the old shibboleths may not
necessarily have future relevance. The future, unclear as it
is, requires that we constantly reappraise both our military
capabilities and how we employ those capabilities in
situations that have not traditionally been in our doctrinal
repertoire. How would the United States respond to a
massive attack on our computer data bases? Who should
respond to conflict driven by ethnic or religious motives that
result in genocide? How will we respond to nonstate
threats? Where are the trip wires?
As the revolutions described here unfold, human
problems will intensify on a global scale. Human problems
are not usually susceptible to technological remedies.
Rather they demand human efforts driven by our humanity
and fueled by compassion and understanding. They also
require a determination to find the kinds of solutions that
bring peace and harmony.
Given our cultural inclination to look for technological
“silver bullets” as quick and easy solutions to complex
problems, we must be careful to select appropriate, relevant
technologies that can be used when our forces are sent to
bring order out of chaos in the mega-cities of the 21st
century, or when they are sent into the killing fields of
backwater countries broken by ethnic or religious strife.
Because the worldwide trend is toward urbanization,
military operations in large urban areas will be increasingly
prevalent in the coming century. We are only just beginning
to explore these operations conceptually. Our inclination
may be to try to avoid cities and their sprawling fringes, but
a savvy enemy, especially one whose forces are fighting at a
disadvantage, will try to pick the best possible battlefield,
one which will put the opponent at a disadvantage.
The fact is, that while the United States and a handful of
other countries will prosper over the decades ahead, much of
the rest of the world faces the new century with very grim
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prospects. Increasing populations and declining
opportunities will be exacerbated by states poorly equipped
to distribute resources. In some regions of the world, the
state-based system is breaking down. When this happens,
violence and discontent almost inevitably follow. These
things are most likely to happen in parts of the globe least
able to contend with the effects of political and social
disintegration.
Future War.
Indeed, the age of revolutions has produced an
abundance of contradictions. Tribal warriors may go into
battle with cell phones while terrorists use computers to
wreak havoc on their targeted victims. Countries, which a
generation ago struggled to obtain and employ World-War
II vintage weapons, will possess weapons of mass
destruction and so will many terrorist groups. Potential
enemies will take shapes we cannot always anticipate.
Nevertheless, now is the time to anticipate the scope and
intensity of 21st century conflict. What follows are several
vignettes based on the revolutions described in the last few
pages. As each vignette unfolds, think about the nature of
the future U.S. military force that would have to respond to
these situations.
Vignette One. In a 21st century mega-city, the capital of
a country in the developing world, civil control completely
breaks down. The country itself, although rich in resources,
is a failed state in which warring factions struggle to control
the sprawling capital. In this modern urban apocalypse,
there are up to twenty million extras, including the city's
former citizens and the millions of refugees from the
countryside who have joined their urban counterparts
cowering in the rubble over which the doped-up thugs fight
viciously in the interests of competing warlords. Amid the
squalor, virulent pathogenic outbreak adds to the collective
misery as it ravishes the population.
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The competing warlords are themselves astute and
resourceful individuals. While they lack high-end military
technology and sophisticated organizational structures,
they have easy access to human source intelligence, know
their environment, and are politically savvy enough to play
off one international diplomatic position against another to
attain their own ends. Their primary commodity is people, a
resource they spend freely. The warlords communicate with
their gunmen through trusted agents who use tribal
dialects unfamiliar to the interpreters who listen for voice
intercepts in orbiting aircraft. Their ruthless use of the local
population as human shields is evidenced by the
widespread carnage. Throughout the city, in shattered
hotels and blasted warehouses, thousands of foreign
hostages are held while international business suffers.
Abroad, among the global diaspora, individuals representing the warlords disseminate disinformation and
protest loudly for the right of their people to settle their
problems free of outside intervention. Others engage in acts
of terrorism designed to make the point that any
interference with their particular faction will be to sow a
wind from which they will inevitably reap a whirlwind.
Vignette Two. From before the turn of the 21st century,
a small state blessed with vital resources has sent hundreds
of its young people to the finest colleges and universities in
the United States and Europe. There, many of these
students studied computer science, most of them attaining
advanced degrees. Others mastered the intricacies of a
prosperous economy, while still others identified
institutional and social vulnerabilities. For any number of
reasons, this state and the United States develop significant
differences over a range of political and economic issues.
This state's leaders proclaim their determination to resolve
these issues peacefully. They point to their relatively puny
armed forces to make the point that “with this tiny army
and small air force, it would be foolish of us to challenge a
great power like the United States.” They offer major
American television networks access to their schools,
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religious shrines, hospitals, and business communities
where well-coached citizens deliver the same message: the
policies of the United States are making our lives
increasingly more difficult.
Meanwhile, as this public information program
develops, their analysts and computer specialists exploit
recently purchased “accesses” to the most important
information nets within the United States and overseas. At
first, the intrusions are hardly perceptible, but they
increase over time. By the time their effects have a
demonstrated lethality, disrupting the lives of Americans in
ways too numerous to count, the cost to our nation has
soared. Data disappears, banking networks are in chaos,
communications fail, and then the transportation system
collapses. In the Midwest, grain cannot get to the feedlots
outside Omaha and Chicago, so cattle, hogs, chickens, and
sheep perish by the millions. Food distribution breaks
down. Computers tracking the trucking industry fail, as
does fuel distribution; commerce ends. Inevitably, the
economy grinds to a halt. By the time the United States
figures out what has happened, hundreds of thousands of
Americans have died. A debate emerges in Washington over
whether or not this “non-lethal” attack warrants a military
response of “the gravest magnitude.” How does the United
States respond?
Vignette Three. For two decades after having his force
decimated by a potent coalition of nations, a would-be
regional hegemon slowly rebuilt his military by purchasing
industrial age military equipment from the former Soviet
Union and the arsenals of other European powers anxious
to sell off older equipment as they downsized and
modernized. In 2020, this army, the preeminent force in the
region, easily occupies a neighboring state.
The United States has to put together an intervention
force to defeat a well-entrenched force consisting of a mix of
combined arms ground forces and limited air and naval
forces. Each component has some advanced systems, and
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there is a sizable arsenal of mobile intermediate range
ballistic missiles that can carry a range of weapons of mass
destruction to include chemical, biological, and nuclear
warheads.
As U.S. forces converge on the area, the enemy
leadership responds asymmetrically. Hostages are held
prisoner in and around important facilities. Jammers
deployed with mobile systems help to disrupt American
targeting systems. Its armored forces move into the
occupied city, while the enemy propaganda machine makes
much of the cultural and historical sites that would be
destroyed by an American aerial attack. Before American
forces can occupy ports and airfields in nearby friendly
countries, missiles whose warheads contain virulent strains
of anthrax are fired into these facilities, making them
unusable. The enemy leaders then indicate that they will
destroy the contested territory rather than lose it.
Vignette Four. A peer competitor does, indeed, arise by
2020. It does not compare favorably with the United States
in every category, but then no two peer competitors have
ever been equal in all areas. For instance, during the Cold
War, the United States had a preponderance of political and
economic power, while the Soviet Union relied on its
military resources. The peer competitor of 2020 has a
limited conventional power projection force, but its strategic
systems place the United States at risk. It also has some
capability for information warfare. More importantly, this
peer competitor has deployed a working anti-ballistic
missile system: its own version of “star wars” largely
developed from American work done in the 1980s and early
1990s.
As 2020 unfolds, this “peer” competitor moves with
apparent disregard for the interests of the United States,
particularly within its perceived sphere of influence. It does
so confident that, within its region, it could place any
military issue between itself and the United States in doubt,
and that, ultimately, it has the ability to raise the ante to an
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unacceptable level. The United States is faced with a risky
and potentially costly conventional war in an area where its
opponent will have significant advantages. Furthermore, it
cannot go in under the cover a nuclear umbrella since this
enemy has a ballistic missile defense and can muster
enough nuclear tipped missiles to incinerate an entire
coastal area of the continental United States. What could
we do?
Measure your concepts of our future force structure
against these plausible vignettes. How did they measure
up? Certainly there could be other scenarios, other
vignettes, and in the intelligence community, we examine a
broad range. But as we develop our capabilities-based
forces, we have to examine those capabilities against an
unprecedented range of contingencies.
As the United States prepares its military forces for the
21st century, we have to see the world as it is likely to be, not
as we would want it to be. As we shape our forces, we must
shape them for real challenges, not idealized ones. Above
all, we have to ensure that our military forces are matched
to the mission, and that their technologies are relevant. The
future will demand powerful assessments and then
reassessments. We will not get it perfectly right, but if we
are wise, and we look judiciously to history as a way of
approaching the future, we can get it mostly right. Perhaps
most importantly, we must remember that warfare is first
and foremost a human endeavor. For the foreseeable future,
men and women will be part of the employment of our
weapons. Finally, the United States has to maintain a
versatile and responsive force.
As in the past, there are those who maintain that one
service has the best remedy for future conflicts; one which
allows the United States to stand off and punish potential
opponents with impunity while risking very little. This
promise has not materialized in the past, and it will prove
false in the future as well. Keep in mind that a future
opponent would have to be stupid not to study the lessons of
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DESERT STORM. How viable is the concept of a precision
strike in a hostage environment? Can we be sure that
dispersion will not, indeed, be a viable remedy for precision?
What if, like North Vietnam, the enemy is simply willing to
endure more pain than we are willing to inflict?
Balance and flexibility are fundamental to our future
defense posture. Flexibility issues from well-structured
human organizations wielding appropriate technologies.
Each new technological advance should generate a series of
tough questions. We will have to develop new organizational forms to take full advantage of information age
capabilities. We must guard against developing those
systems that will be so prohibitively expensive that they
paralyze operational capabilities or that have such narrow
uses that we are compelled to fit our strategies to the
system's capabilities.
A Rare Moment in History.
The world is ready to enter a new millennium, and the
United States is poised on the brink of a rare moment in
history. This nation will enter the 21st century as the
world's only superpower. Our economic strength, the
enduring power of our democratic ideals, and our military
power are extraordinary. But to those to whom much is
given, much is also required.
We have a strategic opportunity now, as the 20th
century is concluding, to prepare our forces under
conditions of greatly reduced risk, at least from any
potentially overarching threat. But the very complexity of
the destabilized world in which we live is sure to generate
continuing challenges. At the moment, and for the
foreseeable future, our technological advantage is secure.
We are ready now for a wide variety of contingencies and we
will continue to build our powerful joint capabilities so that
we can deal with the most dangerous possibilities.
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But the reality is that we are most likely to face forms of
conflict that are unconventional and asymmetrical. These
will be unpredictable, complicated, at times extremely
violent, and inextricably bound to socio-economic issues. As
we modernize our weapons, we must be sure that our
human capital is sufficiently prepared to deal with difficult
and unpredictable situations. While the United States will
continue to need all of its military services, the next several
decades will be the soldiers' era.
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